



PERSPECTIVES 3

Is Terrorism an Issue for Humanitarian Agencies?

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&
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Management
Initiative**





PERSPECTIVES

Papers presented under “Perspectives” introduce original contributions and points of view on risk and security management of non-profit aid organisations. They are not authored by SMI, nor necessarily represent the point of view of SMI, but are issued by SMI as interesting contributions to the debate on risk and security management of non-profit aid organisations.

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ABOUT INSECURITY INSIGHT

Insecurity Insight is a team of experts who apply an innovative method for generating data on the impact of insecurity on people's lives and wellbeing. Insecurity Insight runs independent projects and assists partners in gathering data or making better use of existing data. Its methodology, based on the 'Taback-Coupland model' of armed violence, has been used to study:

- the nature and patterns of people's insecurity during armed conflict
- insecurity associated with sexual, criminal and insurgent violence
- insecurity arising from particular categories of weapon (e.g. bombs, small arms)
- insecurity among particular groups of victims, including journalists and humanitarian workers.

The Security in Numbers Database (SiND) project tracks incidents of violence against aid organizations, their staff members, programs, and offices as well as the impact of such incidents on humanitarian work more generally. The database incorporates incidents submitted by participating partner agencies and open source media reported events.

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I. INTRODUCTION

THE EFFECT OF TERRORISM ON AGENCIES' ACCESS AND ACTIVITIES

Should aid workers be concerned about terrorism? With reports of terrorism regularly appearing in the news, this question is a pertinent one for aid agencies. In May 2010 the Security Management Initiative (SMI) at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) convened a group of experts and international aid/humanitarian agency practitioners to consider the impact of 'terrorism' on the work of humanitarian agencies.¹ In support of this theme, Insecurity Insight used its global Security in Numbers Database (SiND) of events affecting the delivery of aid for empirical evidence to address this question. The SiND is being built in partnership with humanitarian agencies and umbrella organisations and brings together information on a wide range of incidents or threats of violence affecting aid workers and aid delivery, from the most severe to generalized insecurity and threats of violence.²

WHAT ARE 'TERRORIST EVENTS' THAT INFLUENCE HUMANITARIAN WORK?

Terrorism can be described as violence used to inflict fear in support for a political goal. However, a definition of 'terrorism' in relation to incidents that affect humanitarian aid is challenging not only because of the lack of a consensus definition of terrorism but because the term does not resonate well with the humanitarian principle of neutrality in conflict contexts. In reporting acts of violence, humanitarian agencies tend not refer to attacks against them or their work as 'terrorism'. Their reluctance to use such a politicised term, for which some 100 definitions exist³, is understandable since the use of the label 'terrorist' against certain groups may exacerbate the risks for aid agencies. Agencies' avoidance of the term 'terrorist' mirrors the absence of the word in media reports about attacks on these agencies.

This does not mean, however, that groups labeled as 'terrorist' do not attack humanitarian agencies. In fact, the SiND contains 132 violent events affecting aid delivery perpetrated by designated terrorist organizations.⁴ Most events took place in a few countries: Afghanistan (58), Somalia (36) and Pakistan (12)⁵. The overall impact of 'terrorism' on the delivery of aid is much broader than attacks by designated terrorist organisations on humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian workers may be caught in the crossfire of military actions and security operations against 'terrorists' and other armed opposition groups. Law-enforcement and counter-terrorism measures can also affect the ability of humanitarian agencies to provide aid to those most in need, such as where access to volatile areas is restricted or where humanitarian agencies are accused of assisting terrorists through the provision of medical care.

The understanding of terrorism used in this paper, therefore, covers:

- any reported event in which humanitarian staff or the delivery of aid was affected by acts committed by designated terrorist organisations



or by unspecified groups that target aid agencies;

- Any reported event in which state authorities used violence in counter-terrorism measures against designated terrorist organisations or armed opposition groups and where aid agencies were affected by the events; and
- events in which state authorities or law enforcement agencies took administrative or legal measures against aid agencies or staff members in a broad framework of counter-terrorist or counter-insurgency measures.

**SiND DATABASE: SIX
'WS' AND THREE
CATEGORIES**

In practical terms the relevant events were selected from the dataset on the basis of the available information about the perpetrator and the recorded context in which the event occurred. This follows the general approach used by Insecurity Insight where events are analysed on the basis of their particular characteristics rather than any pre-determined label. The database contains information on the so-called six 'Ws': **who** did **what** to **whom**, **where**, **when**, and with what **weapons** as a means of describing the nature of events.⁶ By looking at details and patterns in the variables of the six 'Ws', we have defined three categories of events that present three different forms of terrorist related events ('terrorism' or 'counter-terrorism') that affect aid agencies. At the time of analysis the SiND database included 1,071 incidents for the period 1 July 2008 to 31 March 2010.⁷ 397 of these events are used in this paper in one of three categories of terrorist related events:

Category 1

Category 1: Attacks against aid agencies by armed opposition groups (AOGs), which includes attacks by a designated terrorist organisation.
This category covers 238 events. The term 'armed opposition group' (AOG) is used throughout this paper to describe groups of people who carry out or threaten violent acts that they justify with reference to political objectives of some form, whether directed against their own governments, foreign powers, or aid agencies, for example, in view of the value system(s) they espouse. It also includes other armed groups that deliberately target humanitarian agencies but whose identity may not be known or whose motives are at times obscure.⁸

Category 2

Category 2: Incidents in which the delivery of humanitarian aid is affected because staff members are caught in the cross-fire or vital infrastructure is damaged during military action between government forces and armed opposition groups
This category covers 88 events.

Category 3

Category 3: Incidents in which governments take administrative decisions that hinder the delivery of aid or events in which law-enforcement agencies intervene in such a way that they obstruct the work of humanitarian agencies

This category covers 71 events. It combines legitimate law enforcement actions with administrative or other measures that could be or are politically motivated. A large proportion of these events occur in the context of counter-terrorism.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE TYPES OF EVENTS INCLUDED IN THE THREE CATEGORIES:

Category 1:

On 10 March 2010, fifteen gunmen arrived in pickup trucks and stormed the World Vision office near the town of Oghi in the Mansehra district of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. An eyewitness reported how the gunmen dragged the Pakistani employees one by one into a room where three men and two women were shot and killed. Seven other people were injured. Six days later a seventh person succumbed to his injuries. World Vision worked in Pakistan since 2001. In 2005 the agency provided post earthquake relief and most recently had focused on livelihood programmes for the poorest families in the valley. Most of its staff were Pakistani Muslims. World Vision suspended all operations in Pakistan, where the agency employed approximately 300 people.

Category 2:

A year earlier, on 1 February 2009, two *Médécins Sans Frontières* (MSF) ambulances carrying Pakistani medical staff left Mingora town in the Swat valley to bring people injured in Charbagh in the fighting between the Pakistani army and Taliban-led forces to the hospital for treatment. The clearly marked ambulances were caught in an exchange of fire and two of the medical staff were killed and one injured. MSF suspended its medical activities in Swat, including all life-saving operations, for several months.⁹

Category 3:

In April 2010, nine staff members were arrested accused of planning to assassinate the governor of Helmand province after explosive were found in the hospital. The NGO Emergency believes that someone planted the explosives on the premises of their hospital. Some observers speculate that the organisation's policy of treated any wounded, including Taliban, has been interpreted as partisanship and cause for suspicion.



II. QUESTIONS AND APPROACHES

Should agencies be concerned about terrorism? To answer this question we ask whether there is a specific kind of ‘terrorism’ directed against aid agencies that may be different from ‘general’ forms of terrorism, understood to be use or threat of violence to inflict fear in support of a political goal. We then examine how the nature of the three categories of violent events, threats or interference may vary, how their frequency might differ between the most affected countries, and how agencies responses to the three different categories of terrorist related events might change.

Two problems make such quantitative work difficult: First, in most cases we do not have explicit information on the intention of perpetrators. Event accounts by affected agencies or observers (such as security coordination bodies or the media) can usually only speculate about possible motives when no group claimed responsibility . An assessment of intention in this work can therefore only be based on reported characteristics of the event. Second, we do not have a complete dataset with every single incident. We have even less complete information on the effect of incidents on the delivery of aid. Comparing the relative importance of different types of incidents based on how frequently such types appear in the database is not reliable because various forms of reporting bias may influence the likelihood that different types of event are recorded in the database. Even though we lack reliable information on the motive and the frequency of these events, it is possible to use the data to gain insights into particular patterns of the three categories of violence by highlighting observable differences in the use of weapons, the lethality of events, the reported impact on aid delivery, the location, and the type of attack.

LETHALITY, WEAPONS USED AND INTENTION OF THE PERPETRATOR.

What does Lethality of an event and the weapons used tell us about the intention of the perpetrator?

When the war surgeon Robin Coupland worked in International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) field hospitals assisting war victims he observed that different forms of violence led to divergent consequences in terms of how many people were killed and how many were injured. In considering the lethality of events based on the ratio of killed to injured people (killed/injured), he noticed that the ratio could vary enormously. Observing the nature of events with particular high or low lethality in more detail he noticed that the choice of weapon and the intention of the perpetrator were two important factors that determined how many people suffered and in what form. The intention to kill combined with the use of a firearm usually results in greater numbers of killed than injured. Other types of gun attacks with a lower killed to injured ratio indicate different types of intention.




Perpetrators who used explosives tended to cause large-scale damage, often injuring many people, but killing proportionally fewer.¹⁰ Based on these observations we use the lethality measure (killed/injured ratio) and the type of weapons used as being indicators of the perpetrator’s likely intention to harm. A lethality ratio above 1.0 is indicative of an intention to kill.

COMPARING ATTACKS BY ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS (AOGs) ON HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES (CATEGORY 1) TO GENERAL ‘TERRORIST’¹¹EVENTS’

Events in which armed opposition groups attacked humanitarian agencies have occurred relatively frequently over the past 21 months and have often involved the use of small arms in targeted operations rather than bombings, the second being a tactic widely associated with ‘terrorist’ style events. The 238 attacks recorded in the SiND in which AOGs harmed humanitarian agencies represent an attack on average, every 2.7 days, with varying effects for the organisation.¹² Approximately two-thirds (at least 68 percent, see Graph 1) of attacks by armed opposition groups against humanitarian agencies or their staff members appear deliberate and targeted for unknown motives, for the theft of resources, or as a result of conflicts in which employees may have been involved.¹³

Graph 1 shows attacks and threats by armed opposition groups on humanitarian agencies (category 1), measured in total number of recorded attacks and threats as pre SiND database.

**Graph 1:
Attacks and threats by armed opposition groups on humanitarian agencies**



Source: SiND

General terrorist attacks carried out on hotels, markets or police stations have only occasionally directly affected humanitarian agencies because staff members happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time or because the office was in the vicinity of the attacked building. This suggests that ‘terrorism’ in general has less of a direct physical impact on humanitarian staff than targeted attacks on aid agencies.


Graph 2 illustrates that the tactics used in general terrorist attacks and events that target humanitarian agencies are different. According to the US National Counterterrorism Center, the perpetrators of general ‘terrorist attacks’ frequently use explosives.¹⁴ In contrast, armed opposition groups



frequently use firearms in attacking humanitarian organizations. The use of firearms suggests a greater intention to hit a specific human target, as firearms enable targeting of individuals, as opposed to explosives, which are considerably more indiscriminate in their effects. The targeted nature of attacks on humanitarian agencies suggests that certain armed opposition groups either do not agree with their presence, objectives or programmes, identity, values or modus operandi or perceive a specific strategic or media advantage in attacking them. While these represent possible motives for attacks, without better evidence from the perpetrators themselves it is impossible to definitively determine the reason(s) for an attack.

Graph 2 illustrates the use of different weapons in deaths and injuries during all 'terrorist events' and attacks by AOGs which affected humanitarian aid in 2009, measured in percentage of the total number of reported deaths and injuries.

**Graph 2:
Use of different
weapons in
deaths and injuries.**



Source: US Center for Counterterrorism and SiND

DIFFERENCES IN PATTERNS BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE (CATEGORY 2) AND ATTACKS BY AOGS ON HUMANITARIAN WORK (CATEGORY 1)


Many governments have taken action against armed opposition groups that they regard as terrorists, often leaving humanitarian agencies caught in the fighting. Such events appear less frequent and less lethal for personnel of humanitarian agencies compared to the attacks by AOGs. The SiND recorded 88 such events, in which 23 aid workers were killed and 30 injured in cross-fire events over the 21-month period. This figure is three times less than for category 1, indicating that it is rarer for humanitarian agencies to be caught in the cross-fire than to be the victim of a targeted attack. The difference in numbers of recorded events, however, could also be the result of a greater media emphasis on targeted attacks (category 1).¹⁵ This is one of the key reasons why the SiND examines the nature of events by looking at the six 'Ws' rather than basing a judgement solely on a limited count of fatalities.



Graph 3 shows that cross-fire events in which humanitarian workers are affected (category 2) are less lethal than targeted attacks by armed opposition groups (category 1). In other words, a greater proportion of aid workers tend to be wounded rather than killed when caught in a conflict event compared to events involving targeted attacks on aid workers.


Over half of the category 2 events involved projected or aerielly dropped explosives (61.3%), weapon types that tend to wound more people than they kill. For category 1 events, where AOGs attacked humanitarian workers directly, the perpetrators used explosives in only 37.6% of cases (Graph 4).

Graph 3:
Aid worker lethality,
comparing the ratio of
killed to wounded
(killed/injured) for
direct attacks and
cross-fire events



Source: SiND

Graph 4:
Weapons Use:
comparing the use of
weapons in attacks on
humanitarian
agencies and
cross-fire events.



Source: SiND

THE MOST AFFECTED COUNTRIES


Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan are the countries most affected by AOG attacks on humanitarian agencies (Graph 4). Over the last two years, cross-fire events have most frequently hindered the work of aid agencies in Sri Lanka and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, specifically Gaza. Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan take up places three, four and five respectively in the ranking of countries with the most cross-fire events affecting the work of aid agencies, highlighting the difficulties and



complexities of such environments. In most countries where governments take actions under the label of ‘counter-terrorism,’ armed opposition groups also launch attacks against humanitarian agencies.¹⁶


Graphs 5 and 6 show the top five most affected countries, measured in total number of recorded events for category 1 and 2.

**Graph 5:
Security events
perpetrated by AOGs
(category 1)**



Source: SiND

**Graph 6:
Crossfire events
(category 2)**



Source: SiND

**THE USE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATIVE
MEASURES AGAINST
HUMANITARIAN
AGENCIES (CATEGORY 3)**


Between 1 July 2008 and 31 March 2010, several governments used law enforcement and other administrative measures in ways that have affected aid agencies’ ability to carry out their work. The SiND contains 71 such events, the majority of which were directly reported by affected agencies.¹⁷ Governments have arrested local employees on terrorist charges, denied visas to international staff or revoked their work permits. In some instances, law enforcement agencies carry out important and legitimate work in combating terrorism. In other cases it would appear that law enforcement and administrative measures are used as a deliberate tactic against aid agencies, possibly with the intention to intimidate agencies or curtail their activities. Some of these measures are undertaken in the name of ‘counter-terrorism,’ where agency staff are accused of aiding opposition groups either through provision of services (including medical care) or by informing media or humanitarian agencies of the acute suffering of populations linked to opposition movements. The use of such measures underlines the complex political contexts in which aid agencies operate, and the challenges of being perceived as neutral actors. In this sense, some governments may share the sentiment of designated terrorist organisations with respect to suspicion or



direct hostility to the identity or values of some aid agencies, but use different tactics. As with other events of deliberate obstruction, the true extent of such events is likely underreported and cannot be fully judged until more agencies are prepared to share accounts of such events.

Graph 7 shows numbers of recorded events where law enforcement and other administrative measures have been used against humanitarian agencies, shown as the four countries with the highest number of recorded events.¹⁸

**Graph 7:
Events of law
enforcement
& administrative
measures used
against humanitarian
agencies.**



Source: SiND

III. THE IMPACT OF TERRORIST RELATED EVENTS UPON AID OPERATIONS¹⁹


As the security environment deteriorates, agencies often decide to evacuate staff and temporarily close programmes, sometimes shutting down operations across a wide area. Information on the extent of such effects on aid delivery remains incomplete. The SiND records relocations, disruptions of programmes and suspensions whenever this information is available. Based on the recorded information, it would appear that the most frequent disruptions to operations are caused by AOG attacks against aid operations (74 such events measures were recorded). The available information also suggests that agencies more often take the decision to scale down the operation following cross-fire events than following threats from or violent acts by an AOG. Graph 6 shows how many events in this particular category are recorded in the database per reported disruption to operations as a result of this type of category of event. On average, one in 2.1 cross-fire events led to a disruption in aid delivery, compared to the average of one per 3.2 reported AOG events for disruption to operations being reported and one per 7.1 reported events by law enforcement or administrative bodies for each reported impact.

Graphs 8 and 9 compare reported impact of AOG attacks, crossfire events and law enforcement and administrative measures on aid delivery.

Graph 8 staff relocations, disruptions and suspensions of programmes, measured by the number of reported events per category.




Graph 8:
Reported events of
staff relocations,
disruptions and
suspensions of
programmes, per
category



Source: SiND

Graph 9 shows staff relocations, disruptions and suspensions of programmes, measured by the ratio of reported staff relocations, disruptions and suspensions to the number of reported events per category.

Graph 9:
Ratio staff relocations,
disruptions and
suspensions of
programmes per
category.



Source: SiND

IV. CONCLUSION

Is terrorism an issue for aid agencies? The data show that humanitarian agencies are rarely affected by 'general terrorist events'. In this sense, agencies do not need to be overly concerned about global terrorist events. The practice not to use the term 'terrorist' to label armed opposition movements within the aid community is a prudent one and agencies will do well not to change their attitude in this respect.

The risk of targeted attacks against humanitarian staff and operations in certain countries, however, is real. Attacks by designated terrorist cells and other armed opposition groups have killed, injured and resulted in the kidnapping of at least 662 individuals over the last 21 months. Targeted attacks are also the triggering factor behind the biggest proportion of reported effects on the delivery of aid (58.7 percent). Agencies need to be aware that targeted attacks against humanitarian aid take specific forms, such as the frequent use of firearms and attacks on offices and vehicles. This



can assist agencies in their analysis and implementation of their risk mitigation measures.

Furthermore, the data suggest that aid agencies take security measures that lead to disruption of operations (staff relocation or programme suspensions) most frequently in response to cross-fire events and show the most resilience in responding to legal or administrative actions by governments. Although the number of recorded staff relocations and programme suspensions following an AOG event is almost double those in response to cross-fire events, aid agencies report staff relocations or programme suspensions less often following an AOG event than a cross-fire incident. Several factors could explain these findings. Cross-fire events may be seen as particularly uncontrollable and therefore highly dangerous and potentially costly for the agency. As a result agencies withdraw or suspend programmes because they recognise their inability to diminish the 'effect' on, or 'cost' for, the agency. In contrast, legal and administrative actions tend to be the least 'costly' for an agency in that they rarely result in staff deaths or large-scale damage for the agency. The characteristics of AOGs events suggest that they are most often targeted at a particular actor, leading perhaps to a false sense that 'this won't happen to us'. An acceptance strategy that involves negotiated access and AOG consent for presence provides a mechanism by which to protect against being targeted and could explain why agencies withdraw or suspend programmes less often as a result of AOG threats and attacks. What is less clear from this analysis is how agencies weigh their own risk tolerance in relation to the level of need and their ability to reach and assist beneficiaries.

ENDNOTES

¹ Report of the 5th SMI Senior Security Management Seminar 'Terrorist Threats and Operational Space', <http://www.securitymanagementinitiative.org/>

² The Security in Numbers Database (SiND) started as a pilot project in July 2008. Insecurity Insight signed the first MoU for data sharing in March 2009, and since then six others have been concluded as of October 2010. Information on the evolving database can be found at

<http://www.insecurityinsight.org> under project 'Aid Work in Danger'

<http://www.insecurityinsight.org/projectshumanitarian.html>. The SiND, in contrast with the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD, <http://www.aidworkersecurity.org>), includes all reported security events and not only fatalities, severe injuries, and kidnappings.

³ Jeffrey Record (December 2003). "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism". *Strategic Studies Institute* (SSI). <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub207.pdf>, p.6.

⁴ An armed group was considered a 'designated terrorist group' when it appeared on a government list as a designated terrorist organization. No comprehensive list of organizations exists and different sources were consulted for different organizations. These include: US State Department (<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>), the Australian Government (<http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB001F7FBD?OpenDocument>), the European Union (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_31420051130en00410045.pdf), the Indian Government (http://www.mha.gov.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=292).

⁵ Other events perpetrated by members of designated terrorist groups were recorded in the Philippines (7), Darfur (3), Nepal (3), Sri Lanka (3), Central African Republic (2), Chad (2), Bangladesh (1), Bolivia (1), Colombia (1), Kenya (1), Mauritania (1), and Yemen (1).

⁶ The SiND follows the practice of developing data sets using event data. See, for example, Charles Tilly 2002. Event catalogs as theories. *Sociological Theory* 20(2):248-254. For a more detailed discussion of the approach see Christina Wille. 2010. 'The six 'Ws' of security policy-making' in *Humanitarian Exchange*, 47(June), p.6.

⁷ The SiND database is built from information submitted by partner agencies and from open source media reports. The database includes all security events that affected the delivery of aid as a result of harm to staff members, damage to infrastructure or equipment, or delay or suspension of core activities. The database does not include safety (i.e., accidents or illness) events. We recognize the data on all events are incomplete. As a result, we examine trends within the data as opposed to providing total counts of events to describe trends.

⁸ It excludes attacks by unspecified armed individuals that appear to have been carried out solely for criminal purposes, based on a report indicating items stolen and no known link to political motivation. Theft by named armed opposition groups and specified militia groups, by contrast, is included based on the assumption that the theft is perpetrated for material gain that ultimately serves the political objectives of the armed groups.

⁹ At the time of writing, MSF had restarted some of its medical work in the Swat valley.

¹⁰ Robin M. Coupland and David R. Meddings. 1999. "Mortality associated with use of weapons in armed conflicts, wartime atrocities, and civilian mass shootings," *BMJ*, 319(7202): 407-410. <http://www.bmj.com/content/319/7207/407.full> (Published 14 August 1999).

¹¹ This is a reference to the US database on all terrorist events (See footnote 14). This is a comparison between the info we have in the SiND database and what is in the US database on all terrorist events.



The purpose of the SiND is not to provide complete coverage of all events, and the quoted figures are without doubt an undercount. These 238 events amount to one event every 2.69 days, on average.

¹³ We classified all 238 events perpetrated by AOGs according to the following principles: If the target was clearly not a humanitarian agency (such as a hotel bombing, a bombing on a market etc.) but employee(s) of a humanitarian agency were killed or injured this would be classified as 'wrong place at wrong time'. An attack was assumed to have been targeted: a) if it was carried out in the building in which the humanitarian agency operated, or b) if it involved the kidnapping of staff on the road. The coding was based on the assumption that attacks in marked offices and kidnappings were not accidental events, and were most likely planned and targeted. All other events have been coded as 'unclear' with respect to intention.

¹⁴ The US National Counterterrorism Center counted around 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009. National Counterterrorism Center. 2009 Report on Terrorism, 30 April 2009.

(http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2008_report_on_terrorism.pdf). The National Counterterrorism Center defines a terrorist act as a '*premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents*'. The graph is based on the data shown in two graphs in the published report: a) on death by weapon (graph 3 p,15) and b) injuries by weapon (graph 11 (p.23). The Counterterrorism data includes some double counting, resulting in a cumulative category of 'explosives' that accounts for 126 % of all injuries. To reduce the impact of this double counting, the two categories of 'explosives' and 'vehicle bombs' are excluded in this calculation because they seem to be covered under the category 'IED' The data presented here is thus based on the total number of reported deaths by grenade (2,587), mortar/artillery (2,533), missile/rocket (1,018), and IED (22,976) and deaths from bombings (7'056): Total 36,172 deaths and injuries from explosives / 47,635 total deaths (14,971) and injuries (32,664) = 75.9 %. The firearm data is based on the information of 6'415 deaths from armed attacked (p. 15) and 6'609 injuries from firearms (p. 23). A total of 13,024 firearm deaths and injuries / 47, 635 total deaths = 27.3%. The data on humanitarian actors has been taken from the SiND for the year 2009 for which there are 196 recorded events perpetrated by a designated terrorist group or unspecified armed opposition group which resulted in 109 deaths in 67 reported injuries.

¹⁵ In this analysis, 56.3% of category 1 events came from media reports, compared to 42.0% for category 2 events. Category 2 events were 36.4% of events reported by affected agencies compared to a share of 29.0% of agency submitted information on category 1 events.

¹⁶ For the period under discussion here, the Occupied Palestinian Territories is the only exception where attacks by AOGs on aid agencies are not frequently reported. Pakistan is the sixth most affected country for cross-fire events and Sri Lanka is number ten on the list of attacks by AOGs on humanitarian agencies.

¹⁷ In the SiND, 54% of category 3 events were directly submitted by participating agencies and only 32.4 % of events were reported in the media.

¹⁸ For Ethiopia, Haiti and Kenya two events were recorded. This table is largely a reflection of the countries where participating agencies work and events that occurred since signing of the MoUs.

¹⁹ The SiND distinguishes 'impact' from 'effect', where impact refers to 'cost' of violence for beneficiaries who are deprived of aid as a result of threats, violence or other actions. 'Effect', in contrast, refers to the cost in personnel, resources and infrastructure for aid agencies.

ABOUT THE SECURITY MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE

The Security Management Initiative (SMI) was created to address the challenges in security and risk management faced by non-profit and international organizations in hazardous environments by providing authoritative research, policy development, training and advisory services. Through these products and services, SMI aims to enhance the capacity of non-profit and international agencies to improve risk and security management in hostile environments, reduce the human and program costs for agencies and their staff operating under extreme workplace hazards, and promote a robust security management culture among mid- to senior level professionals of aid agencies.



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